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Abstract 
Numerous studies have linked a range of economic, social, and institutional 
variables with corruption in government. Yet, most of this literature overlooks 
the management of public officials themselves. This is a relevant omission: 
almost all corrupt exchanges involve public officials. This article reviews studies 
– 36 in total – that do address civil service management and anti-corruption. It 
finds that prior works assess a narrow set of civil service management 
structures. Meritocratic recruitment and, less robustly, pay levels have been 
associated with lower corruption. By contrast, robust evidence on how corruption 
relates to other established public personnel management areas – such as 
distinct pay structures (rather than levels), promotion, transfer, and job stability 
practices – is largely unavailable. The article thus calls for research assessing 
the effects of a broader set of civil service management practices to gain a deeper 
understanding of corruption, and how to curb it.  
 
Introduction 
Since the early days of public administration as a research field, corruption 
containment has been among the central aims civil service reforms have sought 
to achieve (Wilson 1887). At the political level, part of the impetus for civil 
service reform, particularly in the United States, came from the wish to fight 
back against corruption pursued through spoils (see e.g. Rubin and Whitford 
2008). To this day, civil service professionalization is regarded as an important 
tool for containing corruption among academics and practitioners (Dahlström, 
Lapuente, and Teorell 2012; Rauch and Evans 2000; Neshkova and Kostadinova 
2012). 
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Nonetheless, as we shall argue in this review article, empirical evidence on how 
the organization and management of civil service systems relate to corruption 
remains scant. The bulk of the corruption literature does not address the 
structure and management of executive government, instead focusing its search 
for corruption correlates on society, the economy, and macro-political institutions 
(for overviews, see e.g. Treisman 2007; Olken and Pande 2012).  
This is a serious limitation. From a scholarly standpoint, studying public 
servants and their organizations means studying the people who are the primary 
actors in corrupt behavior. After all, corruption is usually defined as the abuse of 
public office for private gain. Not focusing on studying public servants means 
forgoing a more fundamental understanding of why corruption occurs and how it 
can be contained. From a practitioner stand point, studying the management of 
public employees provides an opportunity to derive actionable policy 
recommendations that studies of society, the economy, or political institutions 
cannot give. 
This article reviews what we know about civil service management and 
corruption. Following Berman’s (2015, 114) definition of “technical human 
resource management,” (henceforth simply HRM) we understand civil service 
management in this article as “functions for the day-to-day operations of 
managing people in [public] organizations.” Core civil service management 
functions include recruitment, selection, remuneration, promotion, performance 
appraisal, transfer, employment protection and dismissals. To retain a 
manageable and clear scope, our review is circumscribed to this 
conceptualization. We thus exclude the literatures on broader strategic and 
cultural areas of human resource management (e.g. Berman 2015); and on 
oversight and monitoring and corruption (e.g Di Tella and Schargrodsky 2003; 
Olken 2007). 
In total, our review comprises the critical assessment of 36 studies. We identified 
these studies as follows: first, we searched the online archives of nine high-
ranking journals in political science and public administration for all papers 
published since 2000 that had corruption in their titles or abstracts (using the 
truncation corrupt*). The journals and the number of articles identified in each 
are listed in table 1. Second, we excluded from these studies those that did not 
focus on any aspect of civil service management as an independent variable or 
corruption as a dependent variable. Lastly, we searched the references of the 
selected papers and papers or books referencing them using the same criteria. In 
addition, we included any relevant studies that we were aware of, but did not 
reach using this search. As indicated in table 1, this search led us from our 
initial journal selection focused on political science and public administration 
into other fields – most prominently economics but also area studies, 
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criminology, and business ethics. Thus, the study of corruption and civil service 
management is very much interdisciplinary. 
 
Table 1: Overview of searched journals and applied methodology 
Journal 
Article 
count 
Approach 
Experimental 
Other 
quantitative 
Qualitative 
Public Administration 2  1 1 
Governance 4  2 2 
The Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory 
1  1  
Public Administration Review 4  1 3 
The International Public Management 
Journal 
2  1 1 
The American Journal of Political Science     
The American Political Science Review     
The Journal of Politics 1  1  
Comparative Political Studies 1 1   
Other journals  
(public administration, policy, and political 
science) 
16  7 9 
Other journals 
(economics) 
12 5 7  
Other journals 
(other fields) 
14  3 11 
Total 57 6 24 27 
Note: The overview excludes three books and two unpublished working papers; two of which use 
qualitative methods while three use observational quantitative data. 
 
In total, we reviewed 62 studies (57 journal articles, 3 books, and 2 unpublished 
working papers). Of these studies, 27 are qualitative, and 30 quantitative; 6 of 
the quantitative studies are experimental. The distribution of articles and their 
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methodological approach across journals is shown in table 1. As this table shows, 
most experimental work is published in economics journals, while articles 
published in public administration and political science are divided almost 
evenly among mostly observational quantitative and qualitative studies. Most 
studies focus on Europe and Asia (17 studies each), followed by global or cross-
regional studies (10), Latin America (6), Africa (5), and North America (5) (see 
the Online Appendix for further detail). We cite and discuss the 36 that 
contribute to our discussion in terms of separate theoretical arguments and/or 
robust or dissenting evidence. 
Our review finds that most existing literature has focused on recruitment, 
selection and levels of remuneration – yet not other HRM practices. We still 
know little about how transfer or promotions (though see Charron et al. 2017; 
Kwon 2014), pay structures, stable careers or turnover, to name a few, affect 
corruption. We build on these gaps to present an agenda for future research, 
which draws on a more complete pallet of HRM practices and more 
encompassing set of research methodologies. Producing such research would 
provide important guidance to policymakers seeking to manage people in ways 
that minimize corruption risks. 
 
What We Know and What We Don’t 
The literature linking civil service management to corruption has, as noted, 
largely focused on recruitment, selection, and remuneration. We cover below the 
research on each, followed by discussions of the smaller literature on other HRM 
functions: promotions, performance, transfers, job stability, and employment 
protection. 
 
Recruitment and Selection 
Prior studies have variably focused on two aspects of recruitment and selection: 
the criteria determining recruitment and selection outcomes (in particular: merit 
vs. political criteria); and the process through which candidates are selected (in 
particular: examinations vs. appointments).  
Merit- and exam-based recruitment and selection have, at times 
interchangeably, been linked to lower corruption through at least three 
mechanisms. First, officials recruited based on their educational achievements or 
through competitive examinations are argued to be more concerned with their 
reputation among colleagues, leading to greater adherence to norms of behavior 
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such as honesty (Rauch and Evans 2000). Second, merit recruitment has been 
argued to shift accountability. With meritocratic recruitment comes a corps of 
civil servants whose interests diverge from those of their political masters. This 
gives both politicians and bureaucrats an incentive to hold each other to account 
and check corrupt behavior (Dahlström, Lapuente, and Teorell’s 2012). Third 
and related, Neshkova and Kostadinova (2012, 327) argue that the relationship 
to politics is central to how recruitment contains corruption. The absence of 
political criteria in recruitment shelters administrative decisions from political 
rent seeking and makes civil servants better capable of withstanding political 
pressure since their career is not on the line to the same extent and since they do 
not owe their appointments to political superiors. Note that, interestingly, simple 
technical capacity does not feature in most accounts (e.g. Dahlström et al. 2012), 
perhaps because these skills are also useful to “formalize” and “legalize” corrupt 
deals (Janscisc and Jávor 2012).  
A range of studies has provided empirical evidence for the theorized association 
between merit- or exam-based selection and lower corruption, all suggesting that 
merit curbs corruption. Initial evidence came from a cross-national study by 
Rauch and Evans (2000). This was followed by country-level cross-national 
evidence in Dahlström, Lapuente, and Teorell (2012) and, based on civil service 
legislation, Neshkova and Kostadinova (2012). Recanatini et al. (2005) provide 
additional evidence from African and Latin American agencies, though their 
measurement strategy renders distinction between recruitment and promotion 
impossible. More recently, Meyer-Sahling and Mikkelsen (2016) provide evidence 
based on individual-level data from a survey of public servants in five Eastern 
European countries; and Oliveros and Schuster (2017) conduct a conjoint 
experiment in the Dominican Republic, finding the, to our knowledge, first 
(survey) experimental support for the argument that merit recruitment limits 
corruption. Finally, Bersch et al. (2016) use administrative data from Brazilian 
agencies to show a positive correlation between agency politicization and 
corruption. This finding is supported by Heywood and Meyer-Sahling’s (2013) 
qualitative analysis of the Polish ministerial bureaucracy.  
In sum, the literature provides several theoretical arguments linking merit- and 
exam-based selection to lower corruption, as well as quantitative and qualitative 
evidence for a corresponding association.  
At the same time, which mechanism(s) sustains this association has not been 
empirically explored. This is unfortunate as most of the proposed mechanisms 
are, as seen from empirical analyses in the current literature, observationally 
equivalent. Moreover, which of the theorized – or other – mechanisms are at 
play, is likely to depend on context. In organizations staffed by professions such 
as nurses, police officers, or teachers, Rauch and Evans’ (2000) theory intuitively 
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carries some punch. Collegial influences on employee intent and behavior in such 
contexts are well documented (Brehm and Gates 1999 famously referred to this 
as ‘solidary rewards’). In organizations with weaker professions, however, 
meritocratic recruitment is arguably much less like to create the requisite esprit-
de-corps to curb corruption. Similarly, whether politicians are capable of holding 
public employees accountable for corruption as Dahlström et al (2012) theorize 
will depend. Street-level bureaucrats, for instance, are notoriously difficult to 
observe and even managers cannot effectively monitor employee behavior 
(Brehm and Gates 1999). Finally, in systematically corrupt settings, an 
attraction-selection mechanism may be at work: individuals self-select into the 
public sector based on expected future corrupt gains (Banerjee et al. 2015; 
Engvall 2015). In that case, rather than altering norms or incentives after 
selection, meritocratic recruitment may change the pool of available candidates, 
since corrupt individuals may be unwilling to invest in subject expertise to gain 
access.  
To understand the potential and limits of merit recruitment as a corruption-
curbing institution, future research would thus do well to disentangle 
empirically which of these distinct theoretical mechanisms holds in practice in 
which contexts. 
No less important, the literature provides little guidance on which recruitment 
and selection modalities, in fact, are at cause. At the most aggregate level, it 
remains unclear whether recruitment modalities – such as a switch to public 
competition for positions and thus a change in the pool of available candidates 
away from party affiliates – or selection modalities – such as written or oral 
examinations, or other types of assessments – underlie the effect on corruption. 
Existing research provides little guidance on these, from the perspective of 
policymakers, crucial questions.  
 
Remuneration 
Existing studies of remuneration – and HRM and corruption at-large – have 
mostly focused on the effects of pay levels. Theoretically, scholars have argued 
that higher wages (including future wages and other delayed rewards such as 
pensions appropriately discounted) raise the opportunity cost of corruption for 
the perpetrator if caught. This is the 'shirking model,' and the associated 
'efficiency wage' examined in van Rijckeghem and Weder's (2001) prominent 
study. Alternatively, officials’ corruption intent may also be affected by whether 
officials are able to live from their salaries without having to resort to corrupt 
income and consider their salaries to be 'fair' (van Rijkeghem and Weder 2001). 
At the same time, however, higher pecuniary rewards have also been argued to 
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crowd out pro-social motivation and make officials more corruption prone (Navot 
et al., 2015).  
Empirical evidence for the link between pay levels and corruption is mixed. 
Observationally, Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) find a negative correlation 
between wage levels and corruption, though this is not robust to a fixed effects 
specification. Rauch and Evans (2000), Dahlström et al. (2012) and Treisman 
(2000) do not find a correlation between wages and corruption in their cross-
sections of countries. Alt and Lassen (2003) and Dong and Torgler (2013) in turn 
find a negative correlation in a cross-section of American states and a panel of 
Chinese provinces respectively. A few studies even find a positive correlation 
between country public wage levels and corruption (Karahan et al. 2006; Navot 
et al. 2015). Finally, Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003) find that wage levels are 
negatively associated with corruption but only when auditing intensity is at 
intermediate levels. Experimental work to-date is similarly mixed, finding that 
remuneration and corruption are either inversely related (Veldhuizen 2013; 
Armantier and Boly 2011; cf. Azfar and Nelson 2007) or unrelated (Barr et al. 
2009).  
In sum, the literature provides important theoretical arguments linking pay 
levels with corruption, albeit mixed evidence in regards to their validity. This 
may not surprise: the effect of pay levels on corruption may well be context-
specific, depending on a range of other factors. One set of context factors is likely 
to consist of other aspects of pay systems. How large is pay progression (or 
compression) from bottom to top levels? How predictable is salary progression? 
How equitable is salary setting between public officials with similar 
responsibilities? To what extent is pay determined by performance, rather than 
other factors such as political proximity or seniority? Whether public servants 
consider their salary as fair, whether they perceive their long-run income to be 
sufficient to meet household needs, and how large the opportunity costs of 
corruption are to them all depend on not only pay levels, but also these other 
features of public pay systems. Yet, to-date, studies of corruption have omitted to 
study them. 
 
Promotions, Career Systems, Performance, and 
Transfers 
Evidence for HRM functions beyond recruitment and remuneration is only 
provided in isolated studies.  
Promotion systems have been studied in select works, typically with a view to 
assessing whether closed Weberian career systems are more effective than open 
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systems in curbing corruption. The evidence on internal promotions is mixed. 
Rauch and Evans (2000) and Dahlström et al. (2012) find no evidence linking 
them to lower corruption. Recanatini et al. (2005) do find such evidence, but are 
unable to distinguish between recruitment and promotion.  
Whether outsiders may compete for higher-level jobs is, of course, but one of 
many characteristics of promotion systems. Beyond the issue of the candidate 
pool, promotion criteria and methods may matter. Importantly, performance-
based promotions may be useful as an anti-corruption tool if corrupt behavior 
trades off against measured performance (Kwon 2014). Employees striving for 
promotions may not risk prioritizing corrupt gains over meeting standards. A 
similar point applies to performance evaluations. If evaluative standards do not 
permit sleaze or corruption, corruption may become less attractive (Segal 2002). 
Promotion standards may, however, also induce corruption. Analogous to 
recruitment and selection, promotion can be subject to undue political control or 
pressure. Where career prospects improve for employees when they “steal for the 
team,” promotion opportunities can incentivize party-directed corruption 
(Gingerich 2013). Moreover, seniority-based promotions may affect corruption 
incentives. In particular, where career advancements are determined solely 
based on seniority and unrelated to performance, incentives for employees to 
dismantle performance-reducing corrupt systems are stomped (Segal 2002, 448). 
At the same time, seniority-based promotions may curb corruption by protecting 
employees from political pressure and enhancing the predictability of future pay 
rises – and thus opportunity costs of corruption.  
Empirically, only indirect evidence for any of these assertions is available. Kwon 
(2014) associates favorable attitudes towards performance-related promotion 
with less permissive attitudes towards corruption in a sample of South Korean 
public servants. However, in his study, it is not possible to separate the effect of 
promotions from the associated pay raise. Charron et al. (2017) find that a proxy 
for corruption in public procurement in European regions is associated with a 
view among public servants that hard work, as opposed to luck or connections, 
contributes to success in the public sector. Their analysis thus provides indirect 
evidence that merit-based promotion incentives can help reduce corruption. Vice 
versa, Gingerich (2013) finds that officials with a chance of future political 
careers are more willing to “steal for the team;” and Ting and Xiao (2016) show 
that the need to please superiors in the web of relations within the Chinese 
bureaucracy tempts lower-level employees into position-related extravagance. On 
the other hand, Herron et al. (2016) find in a study of Ukraine’s electoral 
administration that professionalization of higher administrative tiers, which 
they argue is a function of promotion practices, co-exists with (a proxy for) 
corruption. 
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Thus, there is no guarantee that promotion opportunities reduce corruption; 
instead, the effect of promotions appears to depend on the criteria upon which 
promotion decisions are made. Direct evidence for whether this assertion holds 
empirically is, however, still lacking. Important avenues for future research thus 
remain.  
The same holds for a related topic, personnel transfers. Classically, Wade (1982; 
1985) argued that the strategic use of transfers was a major propellant of 
corruption in India’s bureaucracy. Like promotions, superiors can use the 
promise of favorable transfers to tempt public servants into participation in 
corrupt transactions or networks; and the threat of involuntary transfer to posts 
in undesirable locations or handling undesirable tasks to push hesitant public 
servants into corruption.  
While these are plausible arguments, we only have scant, qualitative evidence 
for them to-date. Moreover, little remains known about other relevant aspects of 
transfer systems, including whether the frequency of transfers affects corruption, 
or whether transfers are undertaken within- or also between organizations and 
sectors. 
Summing up, existing studies do point to several plausible links between 
different aspects of promotion, performance and transfer systems and corruption. 
Empirical evidence is thin, however, and many aspects of promotion and transfer 
systems remain unexplored. This is this thus an HRM area that is, with respect 
to corruption, ripe for study. 
 
Job Stability and Tenure Protection 
Tenure protections and job stability have been linked on a theoretical level to 
both lower and higher corruption. 
Early public administration research considered protection from politically 
motivated dismissal a key guard post against undue political pressure and 
consequent unethical or corrupt behavior. If elected officials are free to dismiss 
employees, they may be able to pressure them into politically motivated 
corruption (Neshkova and Kostadinova 2012; Rubin and Whitford 2008). 
Beyond creating a bulwark against political pressure, employment protection 
contributes to a central Weberian bureaucracy characteristic that may further 
contain corruption: job stability. Job stability paves the way for long-term 
socialization processes, which may help establish an esprit-de-corps that can curb 
corruption (Bersch et al. 2017; Dahlström et al. 2012; Rauch and Evans 2000). In 
addition, the expectation of a stable public service career, as opposed to a short 
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or uncertain appointment, may make employees less prone to take the risk of 
short-term corrupt gains (Bersch et al. 2017; Heywood and Meyer-Sahling 2013; 
Herron et al. 2016). 
Employment protections may, however, also have the opposite effect. While 
employees are protected from political pressure to engage in corrupt activities, 
they are also protected against dismissal unless unlawful behavior can be 
proven, which is often difficult for covert behavior such as corruption (Oliveros 
and Schuster 2017). Hence, while employment protection can protect honest 
employees from corrupt politicians and managers, it can also protect corrupt 
employees from honest politicians and managers (Segal 2002). If this happens, 
the long-term socialization from job stability may be ineffective as colleagues do 
not report colleagues, or backfire when veterans socialize newcomers into corrupt 
behavior (de Graaf and Huberts 2008).  
Furthermore, for public employees with frequent contact to a fixed set of clients, 
job stability improves opportunities to build relationships and networks for 
corrupt transactions (Choi 2007; de Graaf and Huberts 2008; Jancsics and Jávor 
2012; Sundström 2016). On the other hand, however, networks may also be 
important for corruption containment as it permits potential whistleblowers 
access to information sharing through informal channels (Navot and Cohen 
2015).  
Theoretically, we may thus expect the effects of employment protection and job 
stability to be highly context dependent. It depends in part on whether such 
protections shield principled agents from unprincipled principals, or 
unprincipled agents from principled principals. Empirically, the evidence is thin. 
Rauch and Evans (2000), Dahlström et al. (2012), and Rubin and Whitford (2008) 
find no significant associations between job stability and corruption in cross-
sectional country-level data. Similarly, in a conjoint experiment in the 
Dominican Republic, Oliveros and Schuster (2017) do not identify a significant 
effect.  
In sum, the literature on employment protections and job stability provides 
plausible arguments that their effect depends, but little empirical evidence to 
back them up. Assessing these arguments empirically thus remains an 
important field of inquiry. Furthermore, there is a need to engage with the 
contextual complexities of how stable careers and employment protections 
interact with other HRM functions. Employment protection, for instance, is 
sometimes granted to “blanket in” political appointees to protect them from 
succeeding governments. The theoretically corruption propelling effects of 
political appointments may thus interact with the theoretically corruption 
containing effects of employment protection. The literature to-date is silent on 
these types of interactions.  
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Lessons from the Literature  
At least four broad lessons about civil service management practices and 
corruption may be drawn from the literature. 
First, the only theoretically and empirically (relatively) robust relationship in 
the literature is between merit recruitment and corruption. Where employees are 
recruited based on their professional merit – rather than political or personal 
criteria – they tend to be less corrupt. This may be because of the emergence of 
an esprit-de-corps, reciprocal accountability or greater shelter from political 
pressure, among other mechanisms. Which of these mechanisms hold empirically 
in what contexts remains unclear, however. Moreover, which practices are 
required to bring about merit recruitment in weak institutional contexts – be 
these different recruitment (e.g. public competition) or different selection (e.g. 
written examinations or interviews) mechanisms – remains largely unclear. This 
is a curious omission in the literature. Knowing through which recruitment and 
selection methods corruption can be curbed is arguably more actionable to 
policymakers than knowing to select professionally qualified employees. 
Second, studies have associated pay levels with corruption, both theoretically 
and empirically. Nonetheless, the relationship between pay levels and corruption 
remains contested. This could well be as the effect of pay levels on corruption is 
likely to depend on how the pay system at-large is structured, including how 
large and predictable pay progression is, how equitable salary setting between 
public officials is, and whether salaries are determined based on qualifications, 
performance, seniority or political and personal relations. Future studies would 
thus do well to assess the effect of – and provide evidence to policymakers on – 
public pay characteristics beyond pay levels.  
Third, the literature provides only limited evidence for the effects of other HRM 
functions, such as promotions, transfers, or job stability protections. Other core 
areas of civil service management, such as performance appraisals, do not seem 
to have been researched at-all in relation to corruption (Kwon 2014 is a partial 
exception). These are important omissions. How promotions, transfers, 
performance appraisals or job stability are managed may well affect bureaucratic 
corruption more forcefully than, for instance, initial recruitment. To illustrate, 
how important is initial non-meritocratic recruitment to a middle manager after 
twenty years of working in her agency? We know surprisingly little about 
whether and how more temporally proximate, relative to more temporally 
distant, personnel management decisions affect corruption.  
All of this suggests that the literature would greatly benefit from considering a 
broader set of personnel management practices in the study of civil service 
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management and corruption. When doing so, the literature can also shift 
towards greater consideration of the interdependency of distinct civil service 
management practices. The effect of any given civil service management practice 
on corruption is likely to depend on other civil service management practices in 
place. The challenge for studies is thus clear: develop and robustly assess 
middle-range theoretical arguments around the effects of civil service 
management practices that take into account these context-specificities.  
Our review of the literature also suggests lessons for how scholars may 
methodologically best shed light on these substantive questions. Early 
scholarship on civil service management and corruption largely drew inferences 
from qualitative research and country-level correlations (e.g. Rauch and Evans 
2000; Segal 2002). Yet, studying whether and how varying and interdependent 
civil service management practices affect corruption frequently requires 
organizational or individual level data on civil service management and 
corruption. To obtain such data, recent studies have usefully turned towards 
surveying public servants to improve inferences about the effects of civil service 
management practices (e.g. Gingerich 2013; Meyer-Sahling and Mikkelsen 2016; 
Oliveros and Schuster 2017).  
Since corruption is a sensitive subject, this approach, of course, has its own 
pitfall: survey responses to corruption questions may suffer from bias. Recent 
studies point to two solutions: survey experimental methods, such as list 
experiments, randomized response techniques and conjoint experiments (e.g. 
Gingerich 2013; Oliveros and Schuster 2017); and the use of ‘big data’ proxy 
measures for corruption, such as measures of competition in public procurement 
(Charron et al. 2017).  
These methodological innovations have clear potential to improve corruption 
measurement and inferences about the effects of civil service management 
practices. At the same time, they are no panacea. Survey and administrative 
measures arguably remain imperfect tools to identify effects of management 
practices which have complex and potentially unanticipated context-dependent 
effects. As detailed in the next section, they also fall short of strong causal 
identification by themselves.  Other research designs – including qualitative 
research – will thus continue to play important roles in furthering our 
understanding of civil service management and corruption.  
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An Agenda for Future Research on Civil Service 
Management and Corruption 
Public servants are central to almost all corruption. Not studying how the 
management of public servants shapes corrupt behavior implies missing an 
important opportunity to gather actionable evidence to reduce corruption.  
This review article suggests existing research does well to provide insights on 
some aspects of civil service management, albeit not others; and does well to 
draw on an increasingly innovative – albeit still incomplete – set of 
methodologies. The article thus concludes with a call to research neglected areas 
in civil service management and anti-corruption, and to do so with a more 
encompassing and plural set of methodological approaches. 
We see as the first – and most obvious – future area for research the study of 
civil service management functions whose effects have been neglected in the 
literature to-date. While merit recruitment and pay levels have seen some 
research, rigorous evidence on the effects of other civil service management 
practices – such as promotions, transfers or job stability protections – remains 
scarce to non-existent.  Moreover, other aspects of pay and recruitment – such as 
pay equity or the effects of recruitment versus selection methods – remain 
unexplored. 
Moving towards the study of a broader range of civil service management 
practices would also enable researchers to address context-specific effects more 
seriously. Interdependencies with organizational context and other civil service 
management practices are likely to loom large. To cite just two examples: the 
effects of job stability may well depend on whether public servants are recruited 
based on merit or personal connections; and the effects of higher pay levels on 
whether seniority, performance or favoritism determine pay increases. To tease 
out how variation in context shapes effects, future research would greatly benefit 
from studying the effects of civil service management practices across contexts, 
for instance, across institutions or countries. 
Several methodological approaches hold promise in this regard. Qualitative 
studies can shed important light on unanticipated interaction effects and on the 
mechanisms through which specific civil service management practices achieve a 
reduction (or increase) in corruption. They can also be useful in describing civil 
service management practices in sufficient depth to enable actionable 
recommendations to policymakers. Surveys of public servants in turn can 
provide statistical associations between civil service management practices and 
corruption, moderated by organizational contexts and practices. This approach is 
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particularly insightful where it is undertaken across country contexts and draws 
on recent advances in experimental or administrative measures of corruption. 
Scholars seeking statistical causal identification will, of course, wish to go 
beyond associations towards field experiments, regression discontinuity designs 
(RDDs), or (other) instrumental variables. Strong causal identification has been 
a blind spot in the literature to-date (with few exceptions, e.g. Armantier and 
Boly 2011; Barr et al. 2009; Oliveros and Schuster 2017). As table 1 above shows, 
experiments are few and far in between and mostly concentrated in economics 
journals. This is even though research on other outcomes – such as motivation – 
underscores the feasibility of such approaches (Dal Bó, Finan and Rossi, 2013). 
Bringing them to the study of civil service management and corruption could 
thus yield large payoffs. Their applicability is likely to be constrained, though. 
Practical and legal obstacles may preclude randomizing many civil service 
management practices, such as job stability; and strong instruments and 
discontinuities are challenging to identify.  
Delivering on a boundary-pushing agenda which addresses the many gaps in our 
understanding of civil service management and corruption thus requires a 
substantially and methodologically plural way forward. Policy makers looking to 
address bureaucratic corruption would stand to benefit. 
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Online Appendix 
Civil Service Management and Corruption:  
What We Know and What We Don’t 
 
Jan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling 
Kim Sass Mikkelsen 
Christian Schuster 
Introduction 
This appendix lists the materials reviewed in the paper "Civil Service 
Management and Corruption." To select review subjects, we searched abstracts 
for nine journals in public administration and management and political science 
published since 2000 and containing the term corruption and its variations 
(searching using the truncation corrupt*). Next, we exclude all articles that 
either were not empirical investigations or did not have corruption as their 
dependent variable. Subsequently, we excluded articles that did not focus on an 
aspect of classical personnel management on the independent variable side. 
Finally, using the same criteria, we checked (1) the references in the selected 
articles and (2) other materials citing the selected articles (for books, we read the 
first chapter of the book to judge relevance, chapters we read in full, some works 
either not in English or not available to us we do not consider). 
This appendix shows three lists. First, the list of articles we selected from the 
nine journals: Public Administration, Public Administration Review, Journal of 
Public Administration Research and Theory, Governance, International Public 
Management Journal, American Journal of Political Science, American Political 
Science Review, The Journal of Politics, and Comparative Political Studies. 
Second, the list of articles, working papers, chapters, and books we selected from 
the the references in the articles in the first list. Finally, the list of articles, 
working papers, chapters, and books we selected from the works citing articles in 
the first list on Scopus or Web of Science. For articles of newer date (2013 or 
later), we also did an open Google Scholar search for citing materials. Important 
work in the literature that we were aware of but did not reach using this search, 
we also included in the review (these are listed in the bibliography but not in the 
search mapping below). Altogether, we review 62 studies, most of which (57) are 
published journal articles. 
In some instances, we reviewed material that we decided not to include in the 
paper this appendix accompanies (these are marked NI in the lists below). 
Mostly, these materials either had little empirical investigation or contributed 
little to the discussion in our paper beyond what other materials contain. Of the 
57 studies, 36 are cited in the paper this appendix accompanies). 
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The appendix ends with a complete bibliography of all materials and some 
descriptive statistics on their outlets, coverage, and tools. 
Articles from searched journals: 
Public Administration 
Meyer-Sahling and Mikkelsen (2016) 
Sundström (2016) 
Public Administration Review 
Choi (2007) 
De Graaf and Huberts (2008) 
Neshkova and Kostadinova (2012) 
Segal (2002) 
Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory 
Kwon (2014) 
Governance 
Bersch, Praça, and Taylor (2017) 
Engvall (2015) 
Gong and Xiao (2016) 
Herron, Boyko, and Thunberg (2016) 
Navot and Cohen (2015) 
International Public Management Journal 
Jancsics and Jávor (2012) 
Rubin and Whitford (2008) 
American Political Science Review 
 
American Journal of Political Science 
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The Journal of Politics 
Charron et al. (2016) 
Comparative Political Studies 
Oliveros and Schuster (2017) 
Sources cited by the selected articles: 
Public Administration 
Meyer-Sahling and Mikkelsen (2016) 
• Dahlström, Lapuente, and Teorell (2012) 
• Gingerich (2013) 
• Heywood and Meyer-Sahling (2013) 
• Rauch and Evans (2000) 
• Treisman (2000) 
• Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) 
Sundström (2016) 
• Rauch and Evans (2000) 
• Simser (2011) (NI) 
• Sundström (2015) (NI) 
• Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) 
Public Administration Review 
Choi (2007) 
• No sources 
De Graaf and Huberts (2008) 
• Ahmad and Brookins (2004) (NI) 
• De Graaf (2007) (NI) 
• Treisman (2000) 
Neshkova and Kostadinova (2012) 
• Gorodnichenko and Peter (2007) (NI) 
• Rauch and Evans (2000) 
• Recanatini, Prati, and Tabellini (2005) 
• Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) 
Segal (2002) 
• No sources 
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Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory 
Kwon (2014) 
• Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003) 
• Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) 
Governance 
Bersch, Praça, and Taylor (2017) 
• Praça and Taylor (2014) (NI) 
• Rauch and Evans (2000) 
• Zimmerman (2008) (NI) 
Engvall (2015) 
• Engvall (2012) (NI) 
• Kristiansen and Ramli (2006) (NI) 
• Zhu (2008) (NI) 
Gong and Xiao (2016) 
• Guo (2010) (NI) 
• Venard (2009) (NI) 
Herron, Boyko, and Thunberg (2016) 
• Heywood and Meyer-Sahling (2013) 
• Miller, Grødeland, and Koshechkina (2001) (NI) 
• Oka (2015) (NI) 
• Treisman (2007) 
Navot and Cohen (2015) 
• Beeri and Navot (2013) (NI) 
• Della Porta and Vannucci (2012) (NI) 
• Fritzen (2005) (NI) 
• Heywood and Meyer-Sahling (2013) 
International Public Management Journal 
Jancsics and Jávor (2012) 
• Cepiku (2004) (NI) 
• De Graaf and Huberts (2008) 
• Doig, Watt, and Williams (2007) (NI) 
• Kotchegura (2004) (NI) 
• Miller, Grødeland, and Koshechkina (2001) (NI) 
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• Nielsen (2003) (NI) 
• Treisman (2000) 
Rubin and Whitford (2008) 
• Filmer and Lindauer (2001) (NI) 
• Painter (2003) (NI) 
• Temu and Due (2000) (NI) 
• Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) 
American Political Science Review 
 
American Journal of Political Science 
 
The Journal of Politics 
Charron et al. (2016) 
• Dahlström, Lapuente, and Teorell (2012) 
• Gingerich (2013) 
• Rauch and Evans (2000) 
• Treisman (2007) 
Comparative Political Studies 
 
Sources citing selected articles 
(Additional searches using Google Scholar, all papers after 2013, are marked 
with asterisks) 
Public Administration 
Meyer-Sahling and Mikkelsen (2016)* 
• No sources 
Sundström (2016)* 
• No sources 
Public Administration Review 
De Graaf and Huberts (2008) 
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• Dahlström, Lapuente, and Teorell (2012) 
• Jancsics and Jávor (2012) 
• Jiménez, Villoria, and Quesada (2012) (NI) 
Neshkova and Kostadinova (2012) 
• No sources 
Segal (2002) 
• No sources 
Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory 
Kwon (2014)* 
• Meyer-Sahling and Mikkelsen (2016) 
• Navot, Reingewertz, and Cohen (2016) 
Governance 
Bersch, Praça, and Taylor (2017)* 
• No sources 
Engvall (2015)* 
• Oka (2015) (NI) 
• Herron, Boyko, and Thunberg (2016) 
Gong and Xiao (2016)* 
• No sources 
Herron, Boyko, and Thunberg (2016)* 
• No sources 
Navot and Cohen (2015)* 
• Navot, Reingewertz, and Cohen (2016) 
International Public Management Journal 
Jancsics and Jávor (2012) 
• Jancsics (2015) (NI) 
Rubin and Whitford (2008) 
• No sources 
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American Political Science Review 
 
American Journal of Political Science 
 
The Journal of Politics 
Charron et al. (2016)* 
• No sources 
Comparative Political Studies 
Oliveros and Schuster (2017) 
• No sources 
Additional sources 
• Alt and Lassen (2003) 
• Armantier and Boly (2011) 
• Azfar and Nelson Jr (2007) 
• Banerjee, Baul, and Rosenblat (2015) 
• Barr, Lindelow, and Serneels (2009) 
• Dong and Torgler (2013) 
• Karahan, Razzolini, and Shughart II (2006) 
• Van Veldhuizen (2013) 
• Wade (1982) 
• Wade (1985) 
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Descriptive statistics: 
 
Studies by discipline 
Figures A1-A3 show the distribution of the reviewed studies by discipline, 
geographical region, and methods. 
Figure 1 divides studies along disciplinary lines, classified based on the journal 
in which they are published. Books and unpublished papers (5 in total) are 
exempt. The figure shows that nearly half (25) of the materials we review are 
articles published in public administration journals, while a smaller portion (9) 
are published in other subfields of political science. The remaining materials (26) 
are published in journals outside political science most notably economics (12). 
 
 
Studies by region 
Figure 2 shows the geographical distribution of reviewed studies. The 
geographical focus is first on Asia (17) and Europe (17), followed by a group of 
studies - labelled "international" - either including data from countries from 
multiple regions or cross-national comparisons (11). 
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Studies by method 
Finally, figure 3 shows the distribution of methods used in the reviewed studies. 
About half (33) use statistical tools, 6 of these rely on experiments. The other 
half (29) is qualitative in nature. 
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